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A general response-based technique is presented for 
closed-loop transient stability emergency control. It relies 
on E-SIME, derived from the hybrid transient stability 
method, SIME. E-SIME uses real-time information 
supposed to be furnished by phasor measurement units to 
predict the stability status of the power system, and, in 
view of an imminent instability, to design and trigger 
appropriate countermeasures, while continuing 
monitoring in order to check their effectiveness or to 
apply additional ones. Performance of the method in 
terms of accuracy and rapidity is scrutinized and 
illustrated on several real-world power system examples. 
New technical solutions and algorithms for the accurate 
estimation and prediction of power system quantities most 
relevant to the method are discussed. The observations 
from a recent investigation and conclusions that could 
prove useful for improving further the method are 
summarized together with some realistic timing 
considerations. A natural coupling of the two SIME based 
emergency control techniques: open-loop emergency 
control and E-SIME, so as to combine their 




Power system preventive control in general, aims at 
modifying the system pre-fault operating conditions of a 
system, so as to make it able to withstand otherwise 
harmful events [1].  However, the preventive 
countermeasures advocated could be too expensive or 
inappropriate, since these harmful events may never occur 
or occur under generally different operating conditions 
from those they have been designed for. Hence, the 
desirable complement to all types of preventive control is 
emergency control, where the countermeasures are 
triggered after a harmful event has actually occurred and 
possibly cleared by appropriate protective devices.   
Emergency control can broadly be classified into two 
categories: open loop and closed-loop [2, 3]. Open-loop 
emergency control aims at controlling the power system 
using actions that are assessed off-line on the basis of 
simulations of postulated scenarios and that are not re-
adjusted by following up the system [4]. On the other 
hand, closed-loop emergency control is a desirable 
complement of open-loop emergency control that aims at 
assessing whether the event is going to jeopardize the 
system, at designing and triggering appropriate control 
actions and, further, at following-up the system evolution 
so as to make proper re-adjustments, if necessary. The 
whole cycle relies on real-time measurements.  
Emergency controls can be event-based or response-
based.  Event-based controls are designed to operate 
upon the recognition of a particular combination of 
events, while response-based controls rely on measured 
electric variables and operate when certain threshold 
criteria are met [2].  Transient stability emergency control 
is an extremely important and challenging issue: 
important, because transient instabilities, though rare, 
generally have disastrous consequences; challenging, 
because transient instabilities develop very fast: 
predicting – assessing instability, deciding about control 
actions and triggering them should therefore be achieved 
in extremely short time frames (less than 500 ms).  
Besides, the very design of these various functions is a 
hard task. One is therefore often led to resort to event-
based open-loop transient stability emergency control. 
A response-based closed-loop emergency control 
method, named E-SIME (for Emergency SIME), was 
proposed some years ago [5]. Like SIME from which it 
generates, E-SIME replaces the dynamics of the multi-
machine power system by that of a suitable one-machine 
infinite bus system along with the equal-area criterion. 
This way of proceeding speeds up enormously the 
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involved computations and, at least as importantly, it 
suggests systematic means of control. In addition, E-
SIME makes it possible to predict and control transient 
instabilities within time frames compatible with real-time 
requirements. These achievements are obtained thanks to 
the use of real-time measurements taken on the system 
power plants, rather than time-domain simulations.  
E-SIME has matured since its original design, through 
simulations on a variety of power systems that are 
typically equipped with protection schemes on dedicated 
locations. Recently, the method bas been investigated 
within a European Union project [10]. This has been a 
serious incentive to scrutinize theoretical and technical 
aspects of the method, attempting to make it comply with 
available hardware performance and to free it from 
possible constraints. This paper revisits the original 
method and then focuses on various specifics and 
features, putting the accent on recent advances and 
prospects.  
 




Following a disturbance inception and its clearance, E-
SIME aims at predicting the system transient stability 
behavior and, if necessary, at deciding and triggering 
control actions early enough to prevent loss of 
synchronism. Further, it aims at continuing monitoring 
the system, in order to assess whether the applied control 
action has been sufficient or should be reinforced. 
To reach the above scope, E-SIME uses real-time 
measurements informing about the power system status, 
along with appropriate prediction and control techniques 
sketched in the following paragraphs. 
 
Basic mechanism [5], [9] 
 
The general SIME methodology relies on the continuous 
interplay between the post-fault dynamics of the multi-
machine power system and of a suitable One-Machine 
Infinite Bus (OMIB) equivalent, whose transient stability 
is assessed by the equal-area criterion (EAC). 
Within E-SIME, the information about the multi-machine 
power system dynamics is provided by real-time 
measurements, acquired at regular time steps, ’s, and 
refreshed at the rate . 
it
it∆
Thus, as soon as the system enters its post-fault 
configuration, the multi-machine system information is 
transformed into a suitable OMIB equivalent, defined by 
its angle δ , speed ω , mechanical power , electrical 
power  and inertia coefficient M. (All OMIB 
parameters are derived from multi-machine system 
parameters.) Further, the OMIB dynamics is explored by 
EAC, until reaching the EAC instability conditions 
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Here,  is the OMIB accelerating power, difference 
between mechanical and electrical power, 
aP
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and  is the time to instability: this is the time when the 
OMIB system loses synchronism and the system 
machines split irrevocably into two groups: the group of 
“advanced machines” that we will henceforth refer to as 
the “critical machines” (CMs), and the remaining ones, 
called the “non-critical machines”, (NMs)
ut
1. Thus, at t  
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and the CMs, responsible of the system loss of 
synchronism are those having provided the OMIB that 
met conditions (1). 
 
Predictive transient stability assessment 
 
The prediction relies on the following steps: 
(i) Predicting the OMIB structure: use a Taylor series 
expansion to predict the individual machines’ rotor 
angles; rank the machines according to their angles, 
identify the largest angular distance between two 
successive angular deviations and declare the machines 
corresponding to this distance to be the “candidate critical 
machines”, the remaining ones being the “candidate non-
critical machines”. The suitable aggregation of these 
machines provides the “candidate OMIB”. 
(ii) Predicting the δ−aP  curve: compute the parameters 
of this “candidate OMIB”, and in particular its 
accelerating power and rotor angle,  and aP δ , for (at 
least) three successive data sets acquired at it2it ∆− , 
ii tt ∆− , . Write the equation, it
 
                          (4) cbaP 2a ++= δδδ )(
 
for the three different times and solve for cba ,, 2.  
                                                 
1 The “advanced machines” are the CMs for up-swing instability 
phenomena, while for back-swing phenomena they become NMs.  
2 Subsequently, using newly acquired sets of measurements and 
processing a (weighted) least squares technique, which shows to be 
particularly robust, refine the estimated curve. 
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to determine whether the OMIB reaches the unstable 
conditions (1). If not, repeat steps (i) to (iii) using new 
measurements set.  
If yes, the candidate OMIB is the critical one, for which 
the method computes successively  
– the unstable angle uδ , 










ωδη                             (6) 
 



















               (7) 
 
where iδ  stands for )( itδ  and iω  for )( itω . 
(iv) Validity test. The validity test relies on the 
observation that under given operating and contingency 
conditions, the value of the (negative) margin should be 
constant, whatever the time step. Hence, the above 
computations should be repeated at successive it∆ ’s until 
getting a (almost) constant margin value. 
Discussion: 
• The prediction is possible thanks to the use of the OMIB 
transformation; indeed, predicting the behavior 
(accelerating power) of all of the system machines would 
have led to totally unreliable results.  
• There may be a tradeoff between the above mentioned 
validation test and time to instability: the shorter this 
time, the earlier the corrective action should be taken, 





Principle: Once instability has been detected and its size 
has been calculated, the task of control consists of:  
• Assessing “where” and “how much corrective 
action” to take (pre-assigned type of corrective 
action), and of 
• Continuing to assess whether the executed corrective 
action has been sufficient or whether to proceed 
further. 
The control module of Fig. 1 takes care of the design of 
control actions. For example, when generation shedding 
is of concern, the action consists of determining the 
number of generators to shed. 
Further, the method sends the order of triggering the 
action, while continuing to monitor and control the 
system in closed-loop fashion, until getting power system 
stabilization. Note that the prediction of the time to 
instability may influence the control decision (size of 





Fig. 1 General organization of the E-SIME 
 
Generation shedding: It could happen that the system 
problem cannot be solved by generation tripping at one 
power plant only and coordinated control should be 
examined. The E-SIME provides the amount of 
generation to be tripped. There are two possible 
approaches. The first is to trip at once all the estimated 
generation to be tripped, as soon as the first unstable 
margin appears, by tripping the most advanced machines 
that comprise the estimated generation to be tripped (this 
is the case when estimated time to instability is tight with 
respect to the delays in control action application). The 
second approach trips the machines one by one, starting 
with the most advanced machine; then it monitors the 
system state, to trip again the second most advanced 
machine if the computed stability margin is still negative 
and time to instability is large enough. The approach 
continues until the margin becomes positive; but if after 
tripping the first machine the time to instability is found 
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to be tight with respect to the delays, it trips all the 
remaining generation (estimated to be tripped) at once. 
 
Recapitulating tasks’ definition, duration, relating 
notation 
 
Involved tasks: The foregoing shows that an emergency 
control (EC) cycle comprises the following tasks: 
• Data acquisition at power plants and their 
transmission to the control room, 
• Data processing at the control room, 
• Order transmission from the control room to the 
power, plant(s) to be controlled, 
• Order activation. 
Corresponding durations: Because of short time frame 
(system emergency states) delays in data collecting, 
processing and delays in determined control actions 
application can considerably influence whole system. The 
delays due to data acquisition and processing in the PMU 
are [12, 13], 
 
   T   ratepcacq TTT ≤+=
 
where  is the sampling period of instantaneous 
quantities measured at the PMU site,  is the adjourning 
period of processing by PMU, T  is the sampling rate 




The whole cycle (data acquisition and processing, 
prediction, assessment, decision on control action, control 
action application) can be expressed as, 
 
   T   uswssimeesrate TTTTTTT ≤+++++=
 
whereT is the delay in communication system (it is 
assumed that the delay in receiving measurements are 
approximately the same as the delay in sending control 
signal to the system; actually, the delays are slightly 
different),  is the identification of the fault clearing, 
 is the time required by E-SIME to properly predict 
instability and to decide on appropriate control action 
(this time is negligible with respect to other delays), T  
is the delay in switchgear operation ( T  – delay in 
application of the control action), and T  is the time to 
instability. Assuming that the rate of data acquisition and 
processing is 20 (every cycle of the fundamental 
frequency) and that the communication delays are 
 (this is the measured 
communication delay at Bonneville Power Administration 
for modem communications [2]; for fiber optic it is 

















Information required by E-SIME 
 
Type and number of real-time measurements. The 
required measured quantities are dynamic machines’ data: 
rotor angles, speeds and accelerations; in addition, 
electrical machines’ powers are also necessary for the 
purpose of control. Besides, the machines’ inertias and 
their changes during the process are also supposed to be 
known. [Recall that the real-time measurements are 
supposed to be collected at the power plants and sent to a 
location (control room), possibly close to the dedicated 
site under control.] 
Rate of data acquisition. E-SIME is supposed to receive 
the above machines’ dynamic data at regular time 
intervals. 
Contingency information. E-SIME is activated as soon as 
an anomaly is detected  (contingency inception), 
generally followed by its clearance via protective relays. 
Note that the beginning of the post-fault phase is 
supposed to be known, while knowledge of the 
contingency type and location is not used. 
Remarks: 
• The hardware requirements of the emergency control 
scheme are PMU devices placed at the main power 
plant stations and communication systems to transmit 
this information. These requirements seem to be 
within reach of today’s technology [12-14]. 
• The emergency control relies on purely real-time 
measurements. This frees the control from 
uncertainties about power system modeling, 
parameter values, operating conditions, type and 




The generation shedding scheme described in previous 
sections has been tested (in ideal conditions: full 
observability, noise and delays not considered) on several 
real-life power system models: South-Southeast Brazilian 
System [10], EPRI test system C [9], WECC system [6], 
and Hydro-Quebec system [5]. For want of real-world 
measurements, the E-SIME is illustrated on the basis of 
time-domain simulations using ST-600 program [15] and 
ETMSP program [16]. In this section we summarize main 
results obtained using South-Southeast Brazilian system, 
EPRI test system C, and WECC system. 
 
Power systems description and simulation conditions 
 
South-Southeast Brazilian system comprises 63 machines, 
1.180 buses and 1.962 lines. It is modeled in its usual 
detailed way. The generation shedding scheme is applied 
to the Itaipu transmission system (8 machines of 700 
MW, at the 60 Hz side of Itaipu). Real-time 
measurements are artificially created using ST-600 
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program. The measurements are collected at the rate of 20 
ms. The considered contingency consists of a three-phase 
short-circuit applied at Itaipu and Foz do Iguacu. The 
corrective control action consists of disconnecting  
machines (  should not exceed 5 so as to ensure a 
minimum of 3 machines in service) at the 60 Hz power 
plant of Itaipu. The control order is triggered 150 ms after 
the fault initiation, i.e. 70 ms after the fault clearance (20 




EPRI test system C includes 434 buses, 2357 lines and 88 
machines (of which 14 are modeled in detail) [17]. The 
considered base-case has a total generation of 350,749 
MW. The contingency considered is a three-phase short-
circuit at bus #15 (500 kV) cleared 100 ms after its 
inception by opening the line 1-15. In order to create 
artificially real-time measurements the ETMSP program 
is used. The measurements are supposed to be acquired at 
the rate of 20 ms. WECC system is originally modeled 
with 29 machines, 179 buses and a total load of about 
60,000 MW. However, most of the machines are in fact 
large equivalents and in our simulations one of them has 
been split in two units in order to be able to use finer 
assessment of generation shedding than that consisting of 
shedding a big unit. The contingency considered is a 
three-phase short-circuit at bus MOHAVE 500 (duration 
of 150 ms) cleared by opening the line LUGO 500 – 
MOHAVE 500. The overall delay for the generation 
shedding is considered equal to 150 ms (50 ms to 
centralize all the measurements, 50 ms to send corrective 
action order, and 50 ms to effectively shed the 
generator(s)). For want of real-time measurements the 
ETMSP transient stability program is used. The 




Table I summarizes the results of predictive assessment 
and closed-loop emergency control for the three test 
systems. Fig. 2 illustrates the system response for 
uncontrolled and controlled case for EPRI test system C. 
The contingency considered represents a 3-φ short-circuit 
applied at bus #15 (500kV), and cleared 100 ms after 
their inception by opening one line. 
The contingency is stabilized by shedding CMs. The size 
of this control action, assessed according to Section 2, is 
found to be 3 units among the 7 most advanced ones, 
corresponding to 2,463 MW. The machines shed are 
#1855 (835 MW), #1771 (793 MW), and #1877 (835 
MW). Because of the proximity of predicted instability, it 






TRANSIENT STABILITY ASSESSMENT AND CONTROL FOR SOUTH-











South-Southeast Brazilian System 
155 - - >0 - 
175 2.08 743 -0.54 - 
195 2.07 727 -0.58 - 
215 1.96 596 -1.21 - 
235 1.96 591 -1.23 - 
255 1.95 585 -1.28 1.82 
275 1.93 576 -1.34 1.79 
295 1.93 575 -1.34 1.73 
315 1.93 571 -1.35 1.74 
335 1.93 572 -1,41 1.78 
355 1.93 572 -1.41 1.72 
375 1.94 579 -1.35 1.78 
EPRI Test System C 
375 1.094 788 -0.60 - 
395 0.922 676 -0.81 - 
415 0.850 631 -0.88 0.271 
435 0.822 614 -0.91 0.115 
455 0.813 610 -0.91 0.092 
475 0.820 617 -0.91 0.113 
495 0.826 622 -0.90 0.151 
515 0.836 631 -0.90 0.234 
535 0.850 642 -0.89 0.347 
555 0.858 649 -0.89 0.376 
575 0.861 652 -0.89 0.352 
595 0.860 652 -0.89 0.361 
615 0.859 651 -0.89 0.373 
635 0.861 652 -0.89 0.384 
WECC System 
290 458 -3.54 -  
310 464 -3.35 0.903  
330 466 -3.27 1.208  
350 469 -3.16 1.487  
370 473 -3.05 1.902  
390 475 -2.97 2.025  
410 478 -2.90 2.541  
430 481 -2.83 2.827  
450 480 -2.81 2.835  




a) Uncontrolled case                             b) Controlled case 
 
Fig. 2 The system response for uncontrolled and controlled case 
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The control action is applied at (the 
communication delay is supposed to be 50 ms both for 
data acquisition-transmission and order transmission for 





In this section we first discuss further algorithmic 
refinements of the technique and then present and discuss 
some implementation issues revealed from a recent E-
SIME consideration within EU funded research project 
EXaMINE [11]. The need for better utilization of PMU 
measurements within E-SIME has been identified and our 
current research efforts in this context are shortly 
presented. Further we present a natural combination of 





Current E-SIME technique has some limitations that have 
to be tackled in near future research activities. These 
limitations are as follows:  
• Though E-SIME prediction scheme has been 
validated on various realistic power systems models 
other power systems may bring some new 
phenomena and prediction scheme should be 
adjusted accordingly. It is expected that prediction 
scheme will be system dependent.  
• Methodology relies on the proper contingency 
occurrence and its clearance identification. Using 
consecutive phasor measurements can solve both 
problems. This requires additional processing power 
and will tight requirements on time delays.  
• Appraising various types of control actions such as 
load shedding, fast excitation control, fast valving, 
dynamic breaking, mechanical power modulation, 
etc., should be examined (in the available version, E-
SIME deals only with the generation tripping). The 
emergency control scheme will be strongly system 
dependent and appraising different types of control 
action will make algorithm much more flexible. Even 
existing generation tripping scheme should be 
modified to meet different requirements that different 
systems can impose (generation pattern in the system, 
giving slight priority to hydro plants, taking into 
account benefits and impacts of generator tripping, 
etc.). The generators could be ranked (prioritized) 
according to some specific criteria that are to be 
investigated. 
For the time being, E-SIME assumes that the rotor angles, 
speeds and acceleration are known for all system 
machines. It would be interesting to explore how to 
reduce the number to a small subset (w. r. t. a given 




E-SIME has been considered as the transient instability 
emergency control approach within EU funded research 
project EXaMINE [11]. We rather present most important 
observations related to E-SIME algorithm as a result of 
intensive simulations performed using the model of 
Italian Power System. Particularly, the next parts of E-
SIME were examined: 
- Identification of the equivalent OMIB,  
- Influence of the noise and angle reference to the OMIB 
identification,  
- Influence of the noise to the estimation of the 
polynomial coefficients for approximating relation of 
OMIB aP−δ . 
Observation 1: Two angle references were used for 
critical group identification: center of inertia (COI) and 
initial state reference. If COI angle reference is directly 
used by E-SIME then at the beginning (2-5 time steps 
depending on how fast the phenomena is developing) of 
E-SIME processing the number of critical (and non-
critical) machines varies considerably what causes 
variations in the polynomial coefficients for 
approximating relation between the OMIB angle and 
acceleration power, margin, and time to instability. This 
may cause wrong decisions, particularly in the case of fast 
developing transients. 
Conclusion 1: Using the initial state reference exhibits 
better identification of critical and non-critical machines, 
and consequently correct identification of the OMIB from 
the very beginning of E-SIME processing. This 
eliminates variations in E-SIME prediction at the 
beginning, and allows faster and more accurate 
prediction. 
Observation 2: Computation of the margin is sensitive to 
the noise, particularly the noise in the individual machine 
speeds. Time to instability is less prone to the errors in the 
presence of the noise. 
Conclusion 2: The observation 2 requires reformulation 
of the validity check that was based on checking if 
computed margin is negative and not changing its value 
out of narrow range in two consecutive time steps. The 
new validity check consists of combined check of time to 
instability and computed margin. The algorithm first 
checks time to instability and if it is greater then a pre-
specified value does not check the computed margin. In 
the case that the time to instability is less then pre-
specified value the check on computed margin is 
performed. This may result in some cases of larger 
generation tripping but gives more robustness to the 
algorithm. 
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Observation 3: The presence of the noise, particularly in 
the individual machine speeds, in some cases may result 
in premature declaration of the system being in back-
swing (in this case E-SIME is self-disarming). 
Conclusion 3: The criterion for E-SIME self-disarming 
had to be re-examined. Instead on checking if the OMIB 
speed (due to the mentioned sensitivity to the noise in the 
speeds) reaches zero the self-disarming is now based on 
the check if the OMIB angle is decreasing for the three 
consecutive time steps. 
Observation 4: The estimation of the polynomial 
coefficients that relate the OMIB angle and acceleration 
power is not reliable after receiving just 3 measurements 
following the fault clearance. 
Conclusion 4: The coefficients estimation is becoming 
reliable approximately after receiving 5 measurements 
following the fault clearance. 
 
ANN-based dynamic estimation of generators 
 
Most of the information required by E-SIME is supposed 
to be provided by PMUs. Synchronized phasor 
measurements have been recognized to offer a unique 
opportunity for improving the response of protection and 
control systems to an evolving power swing [2, 11, 15]. 
Note, however, that PMUs do not deliver information 
directly usable by E-SIME: not only because they are 
connected to the high voltage buses, instead of the 
machines’ buses, but also because they measure electrical 
variables (voltages and currents that can experience 
discontinuity under switching in the network), while the 
quantities needed are machines’ rotor angles, speeds, 
accelerations (mechanical variables) and electrical 
powers. In addition, high precision of PMU data is not 
achieved in an actual field installation due to errors from 
instrumentation channels [14], and these data have to be 
pre-processed. This issue of translating PMUs’ data into 
generators’ data we recently addressed in [18,19], by 
using artificial neural networks (ANNs). 
The rotor angle is a nonlinear function of the machine 
terminal variables and the main idea is to employ a 
pattern recognition scheme to map the patterns of inputs 
(variables measured by a PMU) to the required rotor 
angle (and speed).  
This mapping can be represented by,  
 
{ } { } 1: RRuf knk ∈→∈ δ                        (8) 
 
where at 
any instant , and  depends on the number of input 
variables as well as number of previous measurements 
used. To realize the mapping of the machine terminal 
variables measured by a PMU to the rotor angle the multi-
layer feed-forward ANN has been suggested [18,19]. The 
results of our initial and current research efforts in solving 
this problem can be found in [18] and [19]. 





Fig. 3 Distributed rotor angle estimation and procedure using one PMU 
device and one ANN 
 
Fig. 3 shows one of two possible schemes for the E-SIME 
implementation. It is composed of two types of modules: 
Distributed ANN based rotor angle estimation and 
prediction. Each monitored power plant is equipped with 
a PMU device measuring the EHV side current and 
voltage phasors, at a rate of one per each 50 ms interval 
with respect to a common reference frame synchronized 
with the nominal frequency. These signals are then put 
into the actual system frequency reference frame by 
subtracting the phase signal obtained from a remote 
system bus (PMU-ref) and fed into the ANN module 
(three successive values) whose output furnishes an 
estimate of the current value of the power plants average 
rotor angle and its predicted value two time steps ahead 
(100 ms). The ANN module is trained off-line using a 
detailed system and PMU model to generate input and 
output samples.  
]
Central monitoring of loss of synchronism and emergency 
control. This module receives the estimated and predicted 
values of rotor angles computed by the devices of the 
monitored plant, together with the voltage magnitudes of 
the PMU devices. These signals are monitored in order to 
detect fault occurrence near one of the power plants and 
its clearing. Upon fault clearing the E-SIME module is 
armed and starts monitoring the system dynamic 
behaviour. As soon as loss of synchronism is predicted 
the tripping signal is computed and sent to the critical 
power plant.   
The overall round-trip delay was estimated to be about 
350 ms, which led to the conclusion of the feasibility of 
the E-SIME based emergency control scheme. 
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The other implementation scheme that was examined in 
the EXaMINE project used a centralized version of the 
rotor angle estimation modules. With respect to the 
scheme of Fig. 3, this latter scheme has higher throughput 
requirements on the links from the monitored power 
plants to the central location, but reduces the number of 
channels from the PMU-Ref location. Note that in both 
schemes it would be appropriate to introduce redundancy 
on the different devices and in particular in the common 
PMU-Ref device. 
In [19], it has been demonstrated that an intuitive 
approach to directly map phasor measurement inputs to 
the neural network to generator rotor angle does not offer 
satisfactory results. It has been found out that a good way 
to approach the angle estimation problem is to use two 
neural networks in order to estimate the sin( )δ  and 
)cos(δ  of the angle and recover the latter from these 
values by simple post-processing. 
In the context of PMU data better utilization we also 
mention current research efforts on super-calibrator 
concept [14]. In this concept the filtering process is 
confined to the substation, the instrumentation channels 
are explicitly represented and the substation model is a 
breaker-oriented three-phase model and generator 
dynamics included in the model. Errors correction, 
stemming from instrumentation channels, is provided. 
This concept has been studied in [14] in the context of 
power system stability monitoring and prediction. We 
believe that this concept could be extended to power 
system control and is worth further investigation in 
conjunction with E-SIME. 
 
Combining E-SIME with existing event-based emergency 
controls 
 
Installed transient stability emergency controls are 
mainly event-based activated after a selected system 
contingency detection [15,22]. Many emergency control 
schemes of this type, for numerous operating and 
contingency conditions, exist in many power systems 
[15,22]. We believe E-SIME might prove to be an 
extremely useful complement to the existing emergency 
control schemes. Fig. 4 shows a block diagram of such 
transient stability control environment. 
Such a control environment provides an additional 
flexibilities to existing event-based controls by allowing 
control for contingencies and conditions not covered by 
event-based controls and by catering to uncertainty in 
simulation results used to determine control rules and 
limits. In the remaining of this subsection we describe 






Fig. 4 E-SIME combined with existing event-based emergency controls 
 
The OLEC [3] aims at realizing a tradeoff between 
preventive and open-loop emergency control by 
combining preventive with emergency actions. Besides, it 
uses systematic assessment, able to reach a satisfactory 
solution of sufficiently moderate emergency control and 
economically acceptable preventive control. Both E-
SIME and OLEC techniques rely on the general SIME-
based control approach. Hence the idea to couple them so 
as to combine their complementary features, in particular 
the rapidity of OLEC action with the closed-loop 
capability of E-SIME. The approach aims at combining 
advantages of event-based and response-based system 
protection schemes, namely, speed of action and 
robustness with respect to uncertainties in system 
modeling [23]. 
Indeed, despite important assets, E-SIME needs some 
delay (say, 450 ms from the disturbance inception) before 
triggering the control action, and the larger this delay, the 
larger the generation shedding needed. This delay can 
even become fatal to the system integrity, if the 
contingency is very severe. 
On the other hand, OLEC is likely to act much faster (say, 
150 ms after the disturbance inception) since the 
automatic protection activating the generation tripping 
scheme uses only local measurements to detect the fault 
and act, in contrast to E-SIME, which- at least in 
principle- needs all machines’ rotor angles and powers. 
But the suggested action may be incorrect, at least partly, 
given the uncertainties about the anticipated operating 
conditions. 
Coupling the above two techniques may combine their 
advantages while avoiding part of their weaknesses, at 
least from a theoretical viewpoint. In short, this 
combination yields the following scenario of events: 
 
• At t0: disturbance inception.  
• At t1 = 150 ms: triggering the generation shedding pre-
defined by OLEC. 
• At t2 = 180 ms: based on sets of real-time measurements 
(supposed to arrive every 20 ms): E-SIME predicts 
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instability size (margin); time to instability (when the 
system will lose synchronism irrevocably in the absence 
of control action); and decides about control action (CMs 
to shed). 
 
Further, E-SIME compares the above control action based 
on the measurements with the one decided by OLEC and 
already triggered 30 ms earlier, and:  
• If E-SIME assesses the latter to be sufficient, it 
does not take any additional action but simply 
continuous monitoring the system, based on 
incoming sets of measurements; 
• If, on the contrary, it deems the OLEC action 
insufficient, it predicts the system new transient 
stability status (new instability size and time to 
instability), given the action already triggered. 
Note that the new time to instability is larger than 
the one assessed under the assumption of no 
OLEC action; hence, there is more time left to 
refine its assessment, if necessary, and/or to make 
the delay of 300 ms sufficient for preserving the 
system integrity. 




















action designed by OLEC
150 ms
180 ms
Predictive Stability Assessment of Emergency SIME
 using the real-time measurements it receives
with a sample rate of 20 ms
450 ms
Whenever necessary, triggering Emergency





Fig. 5 SIME-based emergency control actions against transient stability 
 
Of course, the above preliminary study should be adjusted 
to cope with technical performances and requirements. 





A response-based technique for closed-loop transient 
stability emergency control is presented in this paper. It 
relies on a method called E-SIME and uses real-time 
information furnished by PMUs to predict the stability 
status of the power system, and to design and trigger 
appropriate countermeasures, and, further, to continue 
monitoring the system in order to check the effectiveness 
of the control or apply additional one. This paper 
revisited the original method, summarized recent and past 
achievements, and then focused on various specifics and 
features, putting the accent on implementation issues, 
important observations and conclusions from recent 
applications, and technical underpinnings in terms of new 
technological solutions and algorithms for accurate 
estimation and prediction of most important power system 
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